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Monkey See, Monkey Do? 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS POSSIBLY 
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S 
INCORPORATION  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the issue’s dormancy for nearly a century, the question 
of whether the Second Amendment1 confers an individual right, separate 
from any connection with the militia, recently reached near hysterical 
fervor.2 The militia-based position states that the Second Amendment 
“protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with 
militia service.”3 On the other hand, the individual right proposition 
“argues that it protects an individual right to possess a firearm 
unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally 
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”4 Federal courts 
were split in their analysis of the issue,5 and in 2008 the Second 
  
 
1
 The language of the Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 
2
 See, e.g., David A. Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring 
Rationale for Excluding the Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1081 (2005) (“Recent developments . . . have catapulted the 
individual right approach to the forefront of the Second Amendment debate.”); Jack N. Rakove, The 
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 104 (2000) 
(describing the issue as one with a “charged atmosphere”); Koren Wai Wong-Ervin, Note, The 
Second Amendment and the Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable Jurisprudence, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 177, 178 (1998) (“Indeed, the Second Amendment is the source of much modern-day 
controversy in both political and academic circles.”); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: 
Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 589 (2000) (“A fierce debate 
about the Second Amendment has been percolating in academia for two decades, and has now 
bubbled through to the courts.”). 
 
3
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008). 
 
4
 Id. 
 
5
 Previously, only two federal Circuit Courts held that the Second Amendment confers 
an individual right to bear arms. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (becoming the first federal appellate court to strike down a gun 
control law); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
Second Amendment does not confer a collective state right tied to the militia). 
  The more numerous federal Circuit Court cases, which expressly rejected the view that 
the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and use arms for solely private purposes, include: 
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 
693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1997), opinion 
vacated in part by 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 
1016, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United 
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Amendment debate culminated in the landmark case of District of 
Columbia v. Heller.6 The Heller Court confirmed that the Second 
Amendment enshrines an individual right to possess and use arms for 
non-militia purposes and declared portions of the District of Columbia 
gun control law unconstitutional.7 
As a result of this escalating debate and significant Supreme 
Court decision, a second question naturally emerges from the fray: Does 
the Second Amendment also serve as a limitation on state action over an 
individual’s right to bear arms through incorporation by the Fourteenth 
Amendment?8 If the Second Amendment were applicable to the states, 
any state or local gun control law would be subject to review under the 
federal Constitution. Many scholars allege that if the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right there would be little to prevent incorporation 
if the Supreme Court then declares that the right is fundamental.9 Despite 
the Court’s pronouncement that it bestows an individual right, however, 
because the history and Framers’ intent concerning the Second 
  
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-23 
(1st Cir. 1942). 
 
6
 After lower federal courts ripened the question for Supreme Court review, on 
November 20, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parker v. District of Columbia to 
decide whether the District of Columbia’s gun control laws violate the Second Amendment. 478 
F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007), and aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
The Court limited the question presented to “[w]hether . . . [three of the District of Columbia’s gun 
control provisions] violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with 
any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their 
homes.” Supreme Court Docket No. 07-290, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-290.htm 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008). The Court’s decision only concerned restrictions on federal gun laws and 
not limitations on state firearm regulations. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23 (noting the question 
of incorporation was not presented by the case); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide on 
Right to Keep Handgun, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/us/21scotus.html?pagewanted=print (“The justices evidently 
decided that this case was not the proper vehicle for exploring [the incorporation] issue, because as a 
nonstate, the District of Columbia is not in a position to argue it one way or another.”). Therefore, 
regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision, the question of incorporation remains undetermined, and 
the Amendment’s history must be reconciled to analyze the incorporation issue.  
 
7
 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 2821-22. Specifically, the majority held the ban on handgun 
possession in the home and prohibition against operable firearms in the home violated the Second 
Amendment. Id. at 2821-22. 
 
8
 Incorporation is defined as “[t]he process of applying the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to the states by interpreting the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause as encompassing 
those provisions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). The Supreme Court 
adheres to the selective incorporation theory as set forth in Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). This standard states that “specific pledges of particular amendments have been 
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
become valid as against the states.” Id. at 324-25 (footnote omitted). Cardozo also suggested that 
rights protected from state interference are those that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, only carefully reviewed and 
tested portions of the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the states. Since Palko the Supreme 
Court has similarly considered whether the right is “fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  
 
9
 See Lieber, supra note 2, at 1083 (“The nature of the right conferred by the Second 
Amendment is inextricably intertwined with the issue of its incorporation against the states.”).  
2009] INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 511 
 
Amendment suggest that it was ratified, at least in part, as a means to 
protect the states from federal encroachment,10 to limit the states would 
be contrary to the Amendment’s original purpose. Thus, regardless of the 
right’s force as applied to federal law, those determining whether the 
Second Amendment should be incorporated must consider and reconcile 
the right’s federalist history. Similarly, much like the history of the 
Second Amendment, the Framers enacted the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause11 to protect the states from federal imposition of 
religion.12 Nevertheless, despite the federalism concerns at the heart of 
the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court incorporated this First 
Amendment clause to apply as a restriction on state action.13  
This Note argues that a historical comparison of the ratification 
of the Establishment Clause and the Second Amendment, and the 
Supreme Court’s later incorporation of the former right, could foretell 
grounds for the Second Amendment’s eventual incorporation. Part II of 
this Note analyzes the federalist history surrounding ratification of the 
Second Amendment and the proposition that it was largely intended to 
protect the states from federal tyranny. Further, Part II discusses the 
various case law and scholarly articles, which suggest that due to the 
Second Amendment’s fundamental federalist purposes, it has not been 
incorporated to limit state action. Part III of this Note details the similar 
federalist history surrounding ratification of the Establishment Clause, as 
well as its surprising incorporation as a check on state action despite 
these federalist underpinnings. Finally, in Part IV this Note investigates 
whether the Establishment Clause’s incorporation sheds light on the 
possibility of the Second Amendment’s incorporation.14 It argues that the 
Second Amendment, despite its intended role at ratification, may limit 
  
 
10
 See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2827 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate purpose 
of the Amendment was to protect the States’ share of the divided sovereignty created by the 
Constitution.”); Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 230 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[I]t is apparent that 
the phrase ‘a well regulated militia’ . . . refers to the maintenance of an effective state fighting force, 
which was specifically included by the drafters of the Bill of Rights to protect the states against a 
potentially oppressive federal government.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Seegars v. Gonzales, 
396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also infra Part II.A (detailing the Second Amendment’s 
ratification). Indeed, Justice Scalia admits in the Heller majority opinion that “the threat that the new 
Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason 
that right . . . was codified in a written Constitution.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801. Justice Scalia 
emphasizes that the Second Amendment was codified to protect militias. Id. Yet to support his 
individual right formulation, he argues that the right to self defense was a “central component” of 
this right, even if it was not an overriding codification concern. Id. 
 
11
 The text of the Establishment Clause reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 
12
 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1157-59 (1991). 
 
13
 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
 
14
 Indeed, one scholar has noted that such a study might be worthy of such attention. 
Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 653 n.80 
(1989). Discussing incorporation of the Second Amendment, Professor Levinson states, “[o]ne may 
wonder whether the interpretive history of the establishment clause might have any lessons for the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.” Id.  
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state action given the Court’s incorporation of the Establishment Clause. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s adherence to selective incorporation and 
the principle that a Bill of Rights Amendment may only be incorporated 
if it involves a fundamental right, the Court was willing to overlook this 
standard during incorporation of the Establishment Clause.15 Thus, this 
Note demonstrates that because the Court was willing to rephrase the 
history and purpose behind the Establishment Clause, it is entirely 
plausible that the same methodology can be used to incorporate the 
Second Amendment, regardless of its original purpose.  
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT: ITS FOUNDATIONS AND THE 
ENSUING FAILURE TO INCORPORATE 
The history surrounding the Second Amendment’s emergence 
and its ultimate ratification reflects the prevailing struggle inherent in the 
creation of this nation’s government.16 Following the Revolutionary War 
and the failed Articles of Confederation, two political groups emerged 
with opposing viewpoints. The Federalists, led by Framers such as James 
Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton sought a strong centralized 
federal government.17 Contrastingly, the Anti-Federalists argued that 
authority be left in the hands of the individual states.18 This fundamental 
divergence spurred the Second Amendment debate, and its ultimate 
adoption reflected a compromise between the two ideologies concerning 
state and federal powers.19  Thus, arguably because the founding fathers 
enacted the Second Amendment as an essential means to preserve state 
sovereignty, the Supreme Court has not incorporated the right through 
the Fourteenth Amendment to serve as a limitation on state action.20 
A.  The History Behind the Second Amendment’s Ratification 
To determine the Second Amendment’s role as a limitation on 
states’ rights, the history of its creation and ratification should be 
analyzed. This history suggests that the Framers intended the Second 
Amendment to act as a stalwart against federal tyranny over the 
  
 
15
 See infra Part III.B. 
 
16
 Lieber, supra note 2, at 1107 (“The singular thrust during the debate over the 
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives 
was the relationship between state and federal power.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
17
 See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 47 (2006). 
 
18
 See Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in 
Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 196 (2000); see also Amar, The Bill of Rights as 
a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1140 (contending that the Anti-Federalists believed that “because of 
the attenuated chain of representation, Congress would be far less trustworthy than state 
legislatures.”). 
 
19
 See infra Part II.A. 
 
20
 See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). 
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individual states.21 The Framers’ fear of an overly powerful and 
oppressive government was rooted in the impetus for the nation’s 
founding—specifically, the break from repressive English monarchal 
rule during the Revolutionary War.22 The founders articulated this 
concern in the Declaration of Independence, which stated that England 
“has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the 
Consent of our legislatures,”23 and that it “has affected to render the 
Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.”24 Additionally, 
driven by the events of Shays’s Rebellion, slave revolts, and attacks by 
Indians and foreign nations, during the early stages of this nation’s 
creation, the founding fathers also feared possible anarchy.25 It was 
against this backdrop that the Framers sought to set forth a government 
that could not only protect its citizens from external and internal harm 
and influence, but also keep the states safe from domination by the 
centralized government.26 Thus, the stage was set for a showdown 
between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists to create a governing 
body of law for the new nation after the weak Articles of Confederation 
proved a failure.27  
The main point of contention between the Federalists and the 
Anti-Federalists in drafting the Constitution at the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention was whether individual state militias or a 
nationalistic standing army should protect the country.28 In reaction to the 
Federalists’ proposition of a national army, the Anti-Federalists feared an 
overly powerful federal government.29 Specifically, the Anti-Federalists 
distrusted a national government with the ability to wield a standing 
army and undermine the States’ ability to keep it in check.30 Therefore 
the contention can be summarized as follows: “[T]he arguments over the 
meaning of the right to bear arms and the militia became embroiled in 
the larger dispute over federalism. Control of the militia became a crucial 
  
 
21
 See, e.g., Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 229-30 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, Seegars v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005); accord Lieber, supra 
note 2, at 1098 (“The addendum of a Bill of Rights reflected a profound and enduring belief among 
Anti-Federalists that the Constitution itself failed to provide sufficient checks on federal power.”). 
 
22
 See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 195. 
 
23
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 13 (U.S. 1776). 
 
24
 Id. at para. 14. 
 
25
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 39. The events of Shays’s Rebellion culminated with a 
violent uprising by a group of Western Massachusetts farmers in armed protest against the state’s 
imposition of high taxes. Id. at 31. The founders were also uneasy about the multitudes of enslaved 
Africans in the South and the possibility of a coordinated upheaval. Id. at 39. Additionally, Spanish, 
British, and Indian occupation at the colonial borders drove safety concerns. Id. 
 
26
 See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 195-96. 
 
27
 See CORNELL, supra note 17, at 39-41. 
 
28
 Id. at 40-41. 
 
29
 Id. at 40. 
 
30
 Id. 
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issue in defining the future balance of power between the states and the 
new national government.”31  
Ultimately, the convention produced a proposed Constitution 
that reflected a series of compromises between the various competing 
concerns.32 Included in this compromise were some answers to the 
question of control over national security.33 In regards to the militia, the 
federal government was given the authority “to provide for calling forth 
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and 
repel Invasions,”34 and to “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]” this 
force.35 The states retained power over the “Appointment of the Officers, 
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress.”36 Congress, however, was also granted the 
power to “declare War,”37 “raise and support Armies,”38 “maintain a 
Navy,”39 and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces.”40 The states were expressly forbidden from 
“keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace.”41 Moreover, the 
President was declared the “Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy” and “of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States.”42 Accordingly, to the dismay of the 
Anti-Federalists, the Constitution granted the federal government a great 
deal of power over national protection and expressly reserved only a 
small role for the states. In a last minute effort before the Constitution 
was sent to the Continental Congress for approval, the less numerous 
Anti-Federalists sought a series of declarations of rights.43 The 
Federalists ultimately rejected these amendments, and the more 
nationalistic Constitution was approved by the Congress and sent to the 
states for ratification.44  
One incident in particular during the Constitution’s ratification 
process demonstrates that the Anti-Federalists were greatly concerned 
with protecting the states from the federal government but believed the 
most ideal way to achieve this balance was through state control rather 
  
 
31
 Id. at 41. 
 
32
 Id. at 42. 
 
33
 Id. at 43. 
 
34
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15. 
 
35
 Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 16. 
 
36
 Id. 
 
37
 Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 11.  
 
38
 Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 12. 
 
39
 Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 13. 
 
40
 Id. at art. 1 § 8, cl. 14. 
 
41
 Id. at art. 1 § 10, cl. 3. 
 
42
 Id. at art. 2 § 2, cl. 1. 
 
43
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 43. 
 
44
 Id. at 43-44. Article VII of the proposed Constitution stated that “[t]he Ratification of 
the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between 
the States so ratifying the Same.” U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
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than the exclusive empowerment of individuals against the federal 
government. In Carlisle, Pennsylvania, authorities jailed a group of 
radical Anti-Federalists after their brawl with Federalists over the state’s 
adoption of the Constitution.45 Rather than post bail, the jailed Anti-
Federalists sought escape by efforts from a local militia, which acted 
without state approval.46 These radical actions highlighted the divide 
between mainstream Anti-Federalists, who sought a strong role for the 
state, and a minority group of radical Anti-Federalists, who fought for 
the rights of local communities and individuals.47 In fact, their extremism 
pushed the more moderate and numerous Anti-Federalists to strongly 
reaffirm that the Second Amendment should correspond with state-
sponsored checks against the federal government.48 Indeed, following the 
Carlisle riot, Pennsylvania’s Anti-Federalists drafted a list of proposed 
constitutional amendments rather than insisting on a new constitutional 
convention.49 Thus, the possibility of an anti-constitutional movement in 
Pennsylvania failed to the dismay of the radical Anti-Federalists.  
Arguably the Federalists also understood that the right to bear 
arms was firmly rooted in a conflict between the states and the federal 
government, rather than one solely between individuals and the federal 
government.50 Throughout the heated public debate over ratification of 
the Constitution, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison 
wrote a series of newspaper articles called The Federalist, which 
advocated for the implementation of a strong national government.51 
Using the pen name Publius,52 the authors accepted that in the unlikely 
chance the nation erupted into civil war, the states could call forth their 
militias against the federal government for protection.53 As one scholar 
suggests, “while Publius conceded that in extreme situations the states 
might have recourse to use their militias against the national government 
in the defense of liberty, he denied that individuals or localities were ever 
justified in a resort to arms.”54 To demonstrate the chaos that would 
result from an unfettered individual right to protect the people from 
government tyranny, Publius compared what would be organized militia 
efforts under state rule with the hectic and disorderly efforts individuals 
  
 
45
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 55-56. 
 
46
 Id. at 56. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 See id. at 57-58 (“While elites on both sides of the constitutional struggle were divided 
on many issues, leading Anti-Federalists and Federalists were accord on one thing: the conception of 
the militia defended by [radical Anti-Federalists] led to Shaysism and anarchy.”). 
 
49
 See id. at 56-58. 
 
50
 See id. at 49. 
 
51
 Id. at 47-48. 
 
52
 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey & McClellan 
ed., 2001). 
 
53
 See id. (“It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the state 
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the 
public liberty by the national authority.”). 
 
54
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 49. 
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would generate against the federal government.55 Thus, the alarm 
presented by leading Federalists illustrates that the concern regarding the 
right to bear arms was tied to the need for state protection against the 
centralized government.56 An unchecked individual right to bear arms for 
protection against federal tyranny most certainly raised fears in the 
Federalists’ minds.57 Thus, when they adopted the Bill of Rights, these 
fears likely influenced the Framers’ impression of the Second 
Amendment’s role. 
After conceding a great deal of militia control to the Federalists 
during the drafting of the Constitution,58 the Anti-Federalists continued to 
advocate in state ratification conventions against accepting the 
Constitution without a separate bill of rights to protect the states from 
federal tyranny.59 In July 1788, this fight finally ended when New 
Hampshire became the ninth state to adopt the Constitution.60 Despite 
this loss, the Anti-Federalists successfully convinced several state 
conventions to add amendments to the ratification documents.61 Because 
most of the suggested amendments were intended to decentralize the 
federal government with structural changes rather than protect individual 
rights, the Anti-Federalists’ overriding concern for states’ rights was 
apparent.62 Indeed, several of the proposed amendments spurred by the 
  
 
55
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey & McClellan ed., 2001). 
Publius explained: 
Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the 
penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have 
better means of information; they can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing 
all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a 
regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. 
They can readily communicate with each other in the different states; and unite their 
common forces, for the protection of their common liberty. 
Id. 
 
56
 Akhil Reed Amar also alleges that Federalist Alexander Hamilton understood that 
“[e]ven if armed, unorganized citizens would face an uphill struggle when confronting a disciplined 
and professional standing army,” and that state governments were the means to organize against 
federal tyranny. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1165. 
 
57
 As one scholar points out, individual rights proponents fail to account for the fact that 
neither the Anti-Federalists nor the Federalists argued the Second Amendment related to anything 
but the militia and the powers of the states and federal government. Rakove, supra note 2, at 161. 
Rakove states, “As the records from the Constitutional Convention, the ensuing ratification 
campaign, and the debates in the First Congress of 1789 all demonstrate, the issue under discussion 
was always the militia, and that issue was posed primarily as a matter of defining the respective 
powers of two levels of government.” Id.  
 
58
 See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text. 
 
59
 Finkelman, supra note 18, at 197.  
 
60
 Id. at 198. 
 
61
 Id. at 199-200 (listing Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New 
York). The Anti-Federalists designed their own amendments in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Id. at 
200. 
 
62
 See id. at 200. Finkelman notes that the Virginia delegates wrote a series of proposals 
that “would have hamstrung the operations of the national government, weakened all three branches 
of the government, and rendered the system more cumbersome.” Id. at 201. For example, Virginia 
Anti-Federalists sought super-majority support for several Congressional decisions. Id. 
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Anti-Federalists were intended to erode the powers granted to the federal 
government and strengthen state control at the expense of individual 
citizens’ rights.63 During state ratification, the Anti-Federalists were 
particularly concerned with numerous constitutional controls granted to 
the federal government over state militias and the government’s apparent 
ability to prevent the states from arming their militias.64 Anti-Federalist 
George Mason stated at the Virginia ratifying convention that 
[t]he militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in 
other parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless—by 
disarming them. Under various pretenses, Congress may neglect to provide for 
arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for 
Congress has an exclusive right to arm them . . . . Should the national 
government wish to render the militia useless, they may neglect them, and let 
them perish, in order to have a pretence of establishing a standing army.65 
In this vein, the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms was 
caught in the midst of a battle over the structure of the emerging 
government and the states’ ability to protect themselves from the federal 
government.66 
When the requisite number of states had ratified the Constitution, 
the First Federal Congress appointed James Madison to sort through the 
various amendments proposed by the states.67 Although the Anti-
Federalists were soundly defeated in the state conventions, “[t]he most 
politically savvy Federalists realized that amendments were necessary to 
assuage moderate Anti-Federalists and help broaden support for the 
Constitution.”68 Accordingly, Madison’s first draft of the right to bear 
arms read: 
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well 
armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but 
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render 
military service in person.69 
Although Madison’s draft seemed to focus on the protection of 
the nation as a whole, Congress did not ultimately accept this language.70 
The House of Representatives eventually reworked this first draft of the 
  
 
63
 See id. at 201-03. For example, among other structural changes, New York Anti-
Federalists proposed amendments that “limited federal diversity jurisdiction only to cases involving 
land grants, prohibited any federal treaty from operating against a state constitution (thus 
undermining the Supremacy Clause), and proscribed Congress from granting monopolies.” Id. at 
202. 
 
64
 See Lieber, supra note 2, at 1107. 
 
65
 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 193 
(Neil H. Cogan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL]. 
 
66
 See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 203. 
 
67
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 59. 
 
68
 Id. 
 
69
 THE COMPLETE BILL, supra note 65, at 169.  
 
70
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 60. 
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Amendment.71 Before submitting it to the Senate, the House moved the 
militia clause before the rights of the people and added “composed of the 
body of the people” to describe the composition of the militia.72 
Presumably unhappy with the clause stating that the militia was to 
provide for the common defense and fearful that it would in effect 
concede state control to the federal government, Anti-Federalists in the 
Senate had the clause deleted.73 The final version of the Second 
Amendment ultimately adopted by the states read: “A well regulated 
militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”74 
To determine the Framers’ intent regarding the Second 
Amendment, acknowledging the proposed amendments the First 
Congress refused to adopt is as helpful as analyzing those they ultimately 
implemented.75 The Framers’ concern with preserving state sovereignty 
is evident both in the proposed amendments the First Congress refused to 
adopt as well as in the amendments it eventually adopted. After the 
defeat at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, the Pennsylvanian 
Anti-Federalists composed a list of amendments called their “Reasons 
for Dissent.”76 Several of the proposals dealt with individual rights and 
were later copied almost verbatim into the Bill of Rights.77 The Anti-
Federalists, however, also included right to bear arms provisions that 
acknowledged both state and individual protections. For instance, one of 
the proposed amendments declared: 
[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their 
own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law 
shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes 
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing 
armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept 
up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and 
governed by the civil power.78 
  
 
71
 Id. 
 
72
 THE COMPLETE BILL, supra note 65, at 170. 
 
73
 CORNELL, supra note 17, at 61-62. There are no records of the Senate debates over the 
language of the Second Amendment. Id. at 61. Cornell notes, however, that a letter written by 
Virginian John Randolph sheds light on the Senate proceedings: Randolph contended, “the Senate 
[was] for not allowing the militia arms” and stated the Federalists feared armed citizens who could 
“stop their full Career to Tyranny & Oppression.” Id. at 62. Thus, Cornell concludes, “[a] well-
armed militia controlled by the states was necessary to provide the states the ultimate check on 
potential federal despotism.” Id. 
 
74
 U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 
75
 See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 207-08. 
 
76
 Id. at 206. 
 
77
 Id. at 206-07 (“The essence, and in some places the exact language, of the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Free Press and Speech Clauses of the First Amendment are found in these 
fourteen proposals, as are the essence and language of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Amendments. Elements of the Tenth Amendment are also found in the proposals.”). 
 
78
 THE COMPLETE BILL, supra note 65, at 182. 
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The First Congress proved unwilling to adopt the obvious 
individualistic right to bear arms provisions that did not advance state 
interests.79 This decision lends credence to the argument that the Framers 
believed the Second Amendment was principally tied to federalism and 
states’ rights rather than solely focused on the individual right to 
protection through the right to bear arms.80 Hence, the First Congress 
sought to avoid framing the Second Amendment with an emphasis on an 
individual’s ability to protect her or himself. Moreover, because the 
Framers were willing to fully adopt other individual right suggestions,81 
the failure to affirm the right to bear arms proposals is another indication 
that the Second Amendment was predominantly linked with federalism 
concerns.82 
In sum, ratification of the Second Amendment can be viewed as 
a way to placate the Anti-Federalist’s fears of a standing army. In 
addition, it served as a compromise between those who advocated for a 
strong national government and those who championed states’ rights as a 
means to protect the states from federal tyranny. Although the Anti-
Federalists sought a more decentralized federal government, the Second 
Amendment was one battle they won on the federalism front. The 
Second Amendment emerged during the great conflict over the structure 
of the new nation and was intimately tied to the Anti-Federalist’s 
platform that the states must be able to protect themselves from a strong 
federal government.83 Thus, at the nation’s founding, the Framers viewed 
the Second Amendment as an important way to equalize the balance of 
power between the states and the federal government.84 Ultimately, the 
people were given the right to bear arms, but the states were granted the 
right to oversee and control the extent of this right.  
  
 
79
 See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 208. 
 
80
 As one Second Amendment scholar aptly states:  
[T]hose who framed and ratified the Second Amendment were seeking not to enshrine 
some generalized right of Americans to revolt against government, nor to empower 
individuals or small groups of disaffected citizens to take up arms against the established 
order. Rather, they sought to protect a specific set of institutions—organized, state-based 
militia—that they saw as playing a crucial, liberty-protecting role in their new 
government structure.  
Yassky, supra note 2, at 628. 
 
81
 For instance, the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Press and Speech Clauses of the 
First Amendment, as well as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments. Finkelman, 
supra note 18, at 206-07. 
 
82
 See id. at 208. 
 
83
 Lieber, supra note 2, at 1107 (“The singular thrust during the debate over the 
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives 
was the relationship between state and federal power.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
84
 See Yassky, supra note 2, at 599 (“[T]he Founders reached a complex and ingenious 
compromise in which both the federal army and the states’ militia were assigned carefully delineated 
roles. The purpose of the Second Amendment was to protect that compromise.”). 
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B.  The Second Amendment as a Limitation Solely on the Federal 
Government: The Resolution Against Incorporation 
The Second Amendment was historically intended as a means to 
protect federalism.85 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has never declared 
that the Second Amendment limits state action86 and has not determined 
whether it should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.87 
Indeed, this Note asserts that in light of its history, it would make little 
sense to hold that the Second Amendment, even though it confers an 
individual right without limitation to militia affiliation,88 can restrict the 
states’ actions given that it was created to ensure their protection. The 
Second Amendment guaranteed the states the ability to arm their people, 
and therefore, if a state wishes to curtail this right, it may constitutionally 
do so. As this Note later discusses, the Supreme Court was willing to 
overlook the Establishment Clause’s history during incorporation, 
however, and therefore could likewise disregard the history of the 
Second Amendment in considering its incorporation.89 
The Supreme Court’s first opportunity to discuss application of 
the Second Amendment to the states was the 1875 case of United States 
v. Cruikshank.90 The defendants in Cruikshank were convicted under the 
Enforcement Act of 187091 and accused of depriving two African 
American males of their right to bear arms.92 The Court stated: 
The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has 
been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This 
is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of 
the national government . . . .93  
Thus, the Court unambiguously held that the Second Amendment is 
merely a restriction on federal action and does not apply equally to the 
states. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this Second Amendment 
limitation eleven years later in Presser v. Illinois.94 The petitioner, 
  
 
85
 See supra Part II.A. 
 
86
 See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). 
 
87
 See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court did not consider 
the question of incorporation in its most recent Second Amendment decision. District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).  
 
88
 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22. 
 
89
 See infra Part III.B, Part IV. 
 
90
 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 
91
 The Act made it a crime when “two or more persons shall band or conspire 
together . . . with intent to . . . injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to 
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him 
by the constitution . . . .” Id. at 548.  
 
92
 See id. at 544-45.  
 
93
 Id. at 553. 
 
94
 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
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Herman Presser, was indicted for violation of the Illinois Military Code.95 
The indictment alleged that Presser paraded in Chicago armed, without a 
license, and without belonging to an authorized state or federal militia.96 
The petitioner challenged the state’s restriction of his right to bear arms 
in violation of the Second Amendment.97 In Presser, the Court relied on 
Cruikshank to find that “a conclusive answer to the contention that this 
amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the 
amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the 
National government, and not upon that of the States.”98 In upholding the 
state’s Military Code, there was no question that the Court believed that 
the Second Amendment is not a restriction on state action. 
In 1894, the Court again definitively stated in its final direct 
ruling on the incorporation question that the right to bear arms only 
curtails federal action.99 In Miller v. Texas, the defendant alleged that a 
Texas law “forbidding the carrying of weapons, and authorizing the 
arrest without warrant of any person violating such law” violated the 
Second Amendment.100 The Court, however, for a third unequivocal time, 
held that the Second Amendment does not limit the states’ authority to 
regulate and was therefore constitutionally acceptable.101  
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has declined three 
separate times to reexamine the incorporation of the Second Amendment. 
Arguably, the Court displayed its continued belief that the Second 
Amendment does not apply to the states when it denied certiorari in 
Burton v. Sillis,102 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove,103 and Silveira v. 
Lockyer.104 Proponents of incorporation could argue that the Second 
Amendment has not been extended to the states because the Court has 
not had the opportunity to deal with the issue since it began to selectively 
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.105 It would seem, 
  
 
95
 Id. at 253. The Code stated that:  
It shall not be lawful for any body of men whatever, other than the regular organized 
volunteer militia of this State, and the troops of the United States, to associate themselves 
together as a military company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms in any city, 
or town, of this State . . . . 
Id.  
 
96
 Id. at 254. 
 
97
 Id. at 260. 
 
98
 Id. at 265. 
 
99
 Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894). 
 
100
 Id. 
 
101
 See id. (“[I]t is well settled that the restrictions of [the Second Amendment] operate 
only upon the Federal power, and have no reference whatever to proceedings in state courts.”). 
 
102
 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968) (state gun control statute).  
 
103
 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (village gun control ordinance). 
 
104
 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (state gun control statute). 
 
105
 Sanford Levinson notes that the Court’s incorporation cases pre-date the start of 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Levinson, supra note 14, at 653. Levinson also acknowledges the 
Court’s opportunities to address the issue and argues “[t]he Supreme Court has almost shamelessly 
refused to discuss the issue, but that need not stop the rest of us.” Id. at 653-54 (footnote omitted). 
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however, that if the Court believed the Second Amendment should be a 
restriction on state action as well, it would have taken the opportunity in 
Sillis, Quilici, or Silveira to address the issue.106 Therefore, the Court’s 
inaction reflects an apparent silent reaffirmation that the Second 
Amendment is not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, most lower federal and 
state courts have also held that the Second Amendment is not 
incorporated, and that it was created, at least in part, to protect the states 
from the federal government.107 Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court closely 
analyzed the continued viability of the Second Amendment as a sole 
restriction on the federal government in light of the increased debate 
surrounding this amendment.108 In Silveira v. Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit 
undertook a historical and textual look at the nature and scope of the 
Second Amendment.109 The Lockyer court confirmed that “the Second 
Amendment imposes no limitation on California’s ability to enact 
legislation regulating or prohibiting the possession or use of firearms.”110 
The Circuit Court also found that the First Congress adopted the 
amendment as a way to “protect the people from the threat of federal 
tyranny by preserving the right of the states to arm their militias”111 and 
highlighted the compromise reached to placate Anti-Federalist fears that 
the federal government could disarm the people by inaction.112 Therefore, 
in accordance with the Ninth Circuit Court’s reasoning in Silveira, a state 
may constitutionally regulate arms as it sees fit.  
  
 
106
 See Lieber, supra note 2, at 1105-06. As one writer asserts:  
While individual right adherents view the failure to incorporate the Second Amendment 
as an abdication of responsibility, the more plausible explanation is that it merely reflects 
the Court’s enduring belief that the Second Amendment does not confer an individual 
right to keep and bear arms, and thus would not constrain state gun regulations targeting 
individual possession and ownership. 
Id. 
 
107
 See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The Second 
Amendment does not apply to the states.”); accord Hickman v. Block 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 
1996) (“Because the Second Amendment guarantees the right of the states to maintain armed militia, 
the states alone stand in the position to show legal injury when this right is infringed.”); Cases v. 
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (“Whatever rights in this respect the people may 
have depend upon local legislation; the only function of the Second Amendment being to prevent the 
federal government and the federal government only from infringing that right.”); Sandidge v. 
United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. 1987) (“[The Second Amendment] protects a state’s right 
to raise and regulate a militia by prohibiting Congress from enacting legislation that will interfere 
with that right. [It] says nothing that would prohibit a state . . . from restricting the use or possession 
of weapons . . . .”).  
 
108
 Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1067-87. 
 
109
 Id. 
 
110
 Id. 
 
111
 Id. at 1086-87. 
 
112
 Id. at 1085. 
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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: ITS HISTORY AND EVENTUAL 
INCORPORATION 
Much like the history of the Second Amendment’s ratification,113 
the Framers’ intent and public opinion supporting the Establishment 
Clause suggest that the Framers intended this clause of the First 
Amendment to protect the states from federal encroachment.114 Thus, the 
same federalist concerns that permeated the Second Amendment debates 
were echoed in the ratification of the Establishment Clause.115 Just as the 
Second Amendment provided the states with a means of protection 
against federal tyranny,116 the Establishment Clause prevented the federal 
government from interfering with state religious establishments.117 
Despite the fact that the Framers and states ratified the Establishment 
Clause solely to restrict federal activity, however, the Supreme Court 
incorporated this part of the First Amendment to limit state action as 
well.118 During incorporation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme 
Court relied upon the Framers’ intent at ratification but limited its 
analysis to the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.119 Many 
scholars, however, have criticized the Court’s reliance as misplaced and 
misguided.120 Instead, scholars note that the proper focus is better 
  
 
113
 See supra Part II.A.  
 
114
 See, e.g., Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A 
Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1703 (1992) [hereinafter Rethinking the Incorporation] 
(“Specifically, the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent Congress from interfering with the 
established state churches and with state efforts to accommodate religion.”); William K. Lietzau, 
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1990) (“[T]he establishment clause, both as originally conceived and as 
understood during the Reconstruction, was meant to be applied only against the national 
government.”); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the 
Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 65, 66 (1962) (“[The 
establishment clause’s] inclusion was intended as an implied grant of power over religion to the 
states as it affirmatively denied the federal government power to make any law respecting a state 
establishment.”). 
 
115
 Ultimately, the First Amendment was created to serve a dual role: first, to protect the 
states from implementation of a national religion through the Establishment Clause and second, to 
grant individuals the right to the free exercise of religion through the free exercise provision. See 
Kruse, supra note 114, at 66.  
 
116
 See supra Part II.A. 
 
117
 See infra Part III.A. 
 
118
 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The establishment of religion 
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 
119
 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-16. 
 
120
 See Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1199-2000 (arguing that there was not one particular 
theory adopted); see also Kruse, supra note 114, at 72-73 (stating that Madison’s views on the 
separation of church and state were not adopted as the basis of the Establishment Clause). Kruse 
argues that although Madison was outspokenly against state support of religion in his home state of 
Virginia, all of his religion amendments were either modified or not accepted by the First Congress. 
Id. Most tellingly, Madison sought specific amendments to restrict state activity, but these were 
explicitly rejected. Id. at 73.  
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directed on the debates of the First Congress and the language of the 
accepted amendment.121 
A.  The History Surrounding Ratification of the Establishment 
Clause 
The Framers’ fear of a centralized federal government with the 
ability to assert control over religion and religious practices was rooted 
in the religious suffering and persecution the early settlers faced from 
European governments.122 Indeed, in large part, settlers seeking to escape 
religious persecution were among those who founded this country.123 
These highly religious people, however, did not entirely renounce state-
established religion in the new world.124 This is evidenced by the fact that 
“[a]t the beginning of the revolution, eight colonies had established 
churches.”125 Moreover, although many colonial charters contained 
provisions similar to the Free Exercise Clause, “no state constitution 
mandated church/state separation.”126 In fact, state establishment of 
religion continued up through the time that the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights were adopted.127 
After the Anti-Federalists failed to defeat the Constitution’s 
ratification, the party sought a Bill of Rights to curtail the federal 
government’s power.128 Although many of the ratified amendments 
served chiefly to protect individual rights from federal encroachment,129 
the Establishment Clause did not.130 The Framers adopted this clause to 
  
 
121
 Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1200. 
 
122
 See Kruse, supra note 114, at 83 (“Perhaps it was knowledge of this history that led 
the delegates, religious men, to the theory that the national government which they were establishing 
should keep hands off religion.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
123
 See, e.g., Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1195-96; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (“A 
large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of 
laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches.”). 
 
124
 Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1196. 
 
125
 Id. at 1197; see generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-24 (1986) (detailing the colonial establishments of religion 
prior to the Revolution). 
 
126
 Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1196-97. 
 
127
 Kruse, supra note 114, at 106 (“[T]he Constitutions of Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Maryland, South Carolina, New Jersey, and Connecticut provided for some 
regulation of religion by their respective governments. Discriminatory tests were required for office 
holders in North Carolina and Delaware.”). 
 
128
 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text; see also Rethinking the Incorporation, 
supra note 114, at 1704 (“[T]he entire Bill of Rights was concerned with federalism. Because it was 
adopted to assuage the fear of centralized power in a national government, none of its provisions 
originally applied to the states . . . . [T]he entire Bill of Rights as originally enacted was coated with 
a veneer of federalism.”).  
 
129
 For example, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment protects several individual rights, including a 
right to indictment by a grand jury, a right against double jeopardy, and a right to refuse testifying as 
a witness against oneself. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 
130
 See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1157-59. 
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ensure the states were protected from any federal action that “tended 
either to establish or disestablish a state church.”131 The Establishment 
Clause’s strong federalist purpose can be gleaned from the ratification 
debates and the text the Framers ultimately adopted.  
The call for an explicit restriction on the federal government’s 
ability to pass religious legislation began during state ratification of the 
Constitution.132 Supporters of the Constitution argued that a bill of rights 
was not necessary because the federal government was one of 
enumerated powers and was not granted the specific power to infringe 
religious freedom.133 This fact, however, did not placate those who 
sought to protect the states from federal imposition.134 As a result, during 
state ratification the Federalists were forced to assure the requisite 
number of states that the Congress would enact a bill of rights following 
ratification of the Constitution.135 After New Hampshire became the final 
required state to ratify the Constitution,136 James Madison drafted a 
proposed set of amendments for the Bill of Rights.137 The original 
religion clauses presented to the House of Representatives read:  
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or 
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and 
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.  
  . . . . 
 No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience or the freedom of the 
 press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.138 
Thus, because Madison explicitly stated how the individual states should 
be restricted in the “equal rights of conscience” clause, it appears that he 
intended that the Establishment Clause prohibit only the federal 
government.139  
  
 
131
 Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1199. 
 
132
 See Kevin D. Evans, Beyond Neutralism: A Suggested Historically Justifiable 
Approach to Establishment Clause Analysis, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 41, 44 (1989); see also 
MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 3-4 (1978) (detailing state proposals for religious amendments to be included in the 
Bill of Rights). 
 
133
 Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, 1705; see also THE COMPLETE BILL, 
supra note 65, at 55 (providing an excerpt of Madison’s remarks to the House). 
 
134
 Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1705-06. 
 
135
 See Evans, supra note 132, at 44. 
 
136
 Finkelman, supra note 18, at 198. 
 
137
 Evans, supra note 132, at 44-45. 
 
138
 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834). 
 
139
 See MALBIN, supra note 132, at 4; Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 384 (1954). Snee states that Madison clearly 
thought it was necessary to limit the states from infringing religious rights, but he did not believe this 
was to be done by preventing states from establishing religion. Id. Rather, Snee argues that Madison 
intended that the amendment “encroach upon the reserved power of the states only to the extent 
necessary to protect the equal rights of conscience; he would leave it to the individual states to adopt 
such measures in the field of religion as they saw fit, provided only that they did not thereby infringe 
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Madison’s draft proposal was referred to the Committee of the 
Whole House, which recommended the “equal right of conscience” 
provision and amended the provision limiting congressional action.140 
Accordingly, the revised provision read, “no religion shall be established 
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscious be infringed.”141 Debate in 
the House concerning this alteration focused on how the exact language 
should read rather than on whom the Establishment Clause would 
limit.142  
Anti-Federalist Samuel Livermore suggested the next version of 
the religion clauses, which read: “Congress shall make no laws touching 
religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.”143 Additionally, another 
Anti-Federalist delegate Elbridge Gerry, was particularly concerned with 
the relationship between federal and state governments and supported 
Livermore’s proposal, which removed Madison’s “national” language.144 
Gerry believed Livermore’s proposal went further than the Committee’s 
in assuring that a state’s right regarding religion would not be 
infringed.145 In particular, Gerry believed the word “national” “implied 
that the Constitution created one nation, with a national government, 
instead of a union of states ruled by a federal government with limited 
powers.”146 The definitive “touching” language of Livermore’s proposal 
ensured that the federal government was significantly curtailed and that 
the states retained full ability to support religion.147 Livermore’s 
alteration defeated the Committee’s proposal, which was silent regarding 
the nation/state debate.148  
The House amended the religious clause a final time before 
sending it to the Senate, and this amendment reflected a compromise 
between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.149 The final proposal stated, 
“Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free 
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.”150 The “nation” 
language that concerned the Anti-Federalists was not reinstated, but the 
  
those rights.” Id. Thus, Madison’s “establishment clause” and “equal rights of conscious clause” did 
not serve the same purpose.  
 
140
 MALBIN, supra note 132, at 4-5. Again, the fact that the Committee also approved of 
two separate religious clauses, only one of which was specifically aimed at state limitation, 
evidences the fact that the Establishment Clause applied only to the federal government. 
 
141
 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834). 
 
142
 MALBIN, supra note 132, at 9 (alleging that debate concerned the clause’s language 
and all delegates agreed that the provision would limit the national government). 
 
143
 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834). 
 
144
 MALBIN, supra note 132, at 10. 
 
145
 See id. 
 
146
 Id. 
 
147
 Id. 
 
148
 Id. at 11. Malbin argues that Anti-Federalists were particularly concerned with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, because “as long as Congress was trying to achieve something it had 
the power to accomplish,” it could pass laws affecting state establishments. Id. at 16. Thus, 
Livermore’s proposal would have prevented the Congress from such action. Id.  
 
149
 Id. at 11. 
 
150
 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 795-96 (Gales ed., Gales & Seaton 1834). 
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strong language preventing Congress from “touching” religion was 
removed.151 Subsequently, the religion amendment passed through a 
series of revisions within the Senate,152 and ultimately the Senate sent the 
House a more limited version.153 The Senate’s revision read, “Congress 
shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”154 The House refused to accept 
the Senate’s proposal and asked that a conference be gathered to consider 
the issue.155 The Committee ultimately adopted the final language of the 
First Amendment, which states, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”156  
The Establishment Clause’s “respecting” language was meant to 
serve a dual function.157 First, it prohibits Congress from passing any law 
that establishes a religion.158 Second, it also quelled federalism concerns 
present during ratification159 by prohibiting Congress from passing 
legislation “with respect to an establishment of religion.”160 Thus, the 
Establishment Clause prevents Congress from interfering with state 
religious establishments.161 This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
Massachusetts did not end its religious establishment until 1833, and 
Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina still exercised some control over 
religion at the time of ratification.162 Accordingly, these states would not 
have approved the First Amendment had they believed it would preclude 
them from religious control.  
Ultimately, the Anti-Federalists sought to avoid empowering 
what they believed to be an already overly powerful central government 
with vast religious control.163 They feared that without an Amendment to 
  
 
151
 See id.; see also MALBIN, supra note 132, at 11. 
 
152
 MALBIN, supra note 132, at 12-13. The Senate debates over the religion amendment 
were kept secret but Malbin suggests that “the succession of amendments offered makes it clear that 
both the wording of the establishment clause and the very presence of the free exercise clause were 
being debated.” Id. at 13. 
 
153
 See id. at 13.  
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 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 77 (Gales & Seaton 1820). 
 
155
 Evans, supra note 132, at 47. It is likely that the House believed that the Senate’s 
proposal was too restrictive and did not sufficiently limit the federal government. See MALBIN, supra 
note 132, at 13. 
 
156
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 
157
 See MALBIN, supra note 132, at 15. 
 
158
 Id. 
 
159
 Id. 
 
160
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
161
 See id. These federalism concerns have been described as “the overriding issue 
throughout the Congress. There should be no surprise, therefore, about its importance [with the 
Establishment Clause].” Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original).  
 
162
 Evans, supra note 132, at 48. 
 
163
 Many feared that the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, “which gave power 
to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the constitution, and the 
laws made under it,” would allow the federal government to make laws which would establish a 
national religion. Id. at 46. 
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explicitly limit the federal government, there would be no way to keep 
the centralized government from imposing its religious will.164 Because 
several ratifying states maintained established religions, however, it is 
clear that the Framers and the states did not believe the Establishment 
Clause would extend beyond the federal government.165 This idea is well 
summarized by constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar:  
The possibility of national control over a powerful intermediate association 
self-consciously trying to influence citizens’ world views, shape their behavior, 
and cultivate their habits obviously struck fear in the hearts of Anti-Federalists. 
Yet local control over such intermediate organizations seemed far less 
threatening, less distant, less aristocratic, less monopolistic—just as local banks 
were far less threatening than a national one, and local militias less dangerous 
than a national standard army.166 
Thus, the fundamental purpose of the Establishment Clause is best 
described as a means to limit federal power over the states and prevent 
interference with the states’ authority over religious establishments.  
B.  The Surprising Incorporation of the Establishment Clause 
Because the Framers adapted the Establishment Clause as a 
means to protect the states from the federal government,167 it would make 
little sense to incorporate it as a limitation on state action.168 Indeed, a 
mere cursory reading confirms that the language unambiguously limits 
only congressional action. In 1984, however, the Supreme Court 
extended the Establishment Clause to curtail state action in Everson v. 
Board of Education.169 In Everson, Justice Black, writing for the 
majority, held that the Establishment Clause applies equally as a restraint 
on the federal and state governments.170 Black reached this conclusion 
after first describing the religious persecution suffered by those who 
settled in America and the continuation of such practices in the 
colonies.171 Black argued that this climate “aroused the sentiment that 
  
 
164
 See Lietzau, supra note 114, at 1199 (“The establishment clause was an explicit 
restriction on the federal government’s power to meddle in the religious establishments that then 
existed.”). 
 
165
 Id. at 1201 (“All the states with established churches ratified the amendment without 
any expressed concern.”). 
 
166
 Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (1996). 
 
167
 See supra Part III.A. 
 
168
 See Evans, supra note 132, at 67 (arguing that holding that “the establishment clause 
applies to the states produce[s] an ironic result: an amendment supported by the states as a means to 
protect their sovereignty was applied to the states as a means to limit their power”). 
 
169
 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
 
170
 Id. (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least 
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which 
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”). 
 
171
 Id. at 8-11. Specifically Black detailed the persecution that occurred in Europe 
amongst Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Id. at 8-9. Moreover, Black described how this intolerance 
continued in the new world between Catholics, Quakers, Baptists, and Protestants. Id. at 10-11.  
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culminated in adoption of the Bills of Rights’ provisions embracing 
religious liberty.”172 Specifically, Black focused on the beliefs of James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, two people who played a large role in 
the new nation’s development.173 Accordingly, Black concluded that the 
Establishment Clause was included in an Amendment that protects an 
“individual’s religious freedom.”174 Interestingly (and perhaps tellingly), 
Justice Black did not analyze the Establishment Clause under the Palko 
incorporation test175 to determine whether the clause confers a 
fundamental right.176 Without great explanation, Justice Black held that 
because the Supreme Court had already incorporated the Free Exercise 
Clause, “there is every reason to give the same application and broad 
interpretation to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause.”177 Thus, the 
Court found that the Establishment Clause limits state action in the same 
manner as Congressional action. 
Later Supreme Court cases did not attempt to amend or 
challenge the Court’s Everson reasoning. For instance, a year after the 
Everson decision, the Court held that a state practice that permitted 
religious instruction in public schools was a First Amendment 
violation.178 The Court did not address the state’s argument that the 
Establishment Clause should not be applicable to the states,179 and 
reiterated Everson’s holding that “the First Amendment has erected a 
wall between Church and State which must be kept high and 
impregnable.” 180 Additionally, in Engle v. Vitale, the Court struck down 
  
 
172
 Id. at 11. 
 
173
 Many scholars have criticized the Court’s focus on Madison and Jefferson’s intent. See 
supra note 120 and accompanying text. Because the amendment ultimately ratified was altered 
several times before its final form, it is more appropriate to study the intent of the entire First 
Congress and the ratifying states. See supra Part.III.A; see also Rethinking the Incorporation, supra 
note 114, at 1704-05 (arguing that even though Madison and Jefferson may have supported a 
separation of church and state in Virginia, it should not be assumed that they therefore “supported a 
federally-imposed requirement of separation of church and state”). 
 
174
 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). Justice Black concluded with this often-
cited phrase: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be 
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.” Id. at 18. The Court quoted 
this language from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879), which borrowed the quote 
from Thomas Jefferson. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. Incidentally, in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice 
Rehnquist pointed out that Jefferson made this statement fourteen years after the Amendments were 
ratified and therefore “he would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of 
contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” 472 U.S. 
38, 92 (1985). 
 
175
 See supra note 8. Thus, the Court did not explicitly determine that the Establishment 
Clause conferred a right that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and is “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscious of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937). 
 
176
 See Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1702 (“Everson is devoid of any 
analysis justifying the incorporation of the Establishment Clause under Palko’s selective 
incorporation test.”). 
 
177
 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.  
 
178
 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948). 
 
179
 Id. at 211. 
 
180
 Id. at 212. 
530 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2 
 
a New York law mandating daily recitation of prayer in public schools as 
a violation of the Establishment Clause.181 The Court, per Justice Black, 
agreed with the petitioners that a law requiring prayer in public schools 
“breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and 
State” and again upheld the Everson reasoning.182 
A year later in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 
Justice Brennan attempted to square incorporation of the Establishment 
Clause with its federalist underpinnings.183 In Schempp, Justice Brennan 
alleged, “[i]t has been suggested, with some support in history, that 
absorption of the [Establishment Clause] . . . is conceptually impossible 
because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose 
any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state 
churches.”184 Brennan responded to this concern by holding that despite 
what may have been relevant during ratification,  
it is clear on the record of history that the last of the formal state establishments 
was dissolved more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, and thus the problem of protecting official state churches from federal 
encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who framed the 
[Fourteenth Amendment].185  
Hence, it appears that Justice Brennan would argue that state religious 
establishments are extinct, and therefore the underlying reasons for non-
incorporation are effectively null. 
To refute the allegation that the Establishment Clause does not 
protect an individual liberty or freedom, Justice Brennan asserted that, 
“[t]he fallacy in this contention . . . is that it underestimates the role of 
the Establishment Clause as a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise 
Clause, of religious liberty.”186 Unfortunately, this conclusory statement 
fails to adequately explain how the Establishment Clause, as 
distinguished from the Free Exercise Clause, solely guards an individual 
right if it was originally intended to protect the states. Perhaps it could 
again be argued that because all states have abolished their religious 
establishments, the federalist basis for the Establishment Clause is no 
longer necessary or valid. That reasoning, however, fails to take into 
consideration that the states might seek to regulate religion through 
means other than state establishments.  
A recent controversial challenge to the Establishment Clause’s 
incorporation came in the 1983 case of Jaffree v. Board of School 
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 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
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 Id. at 425. 
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 374 U.S. 203, 254 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 
184
 Id. 
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 Id. at 254-55 (footnote omitted). A possible criticism of Brennan’s reasoning is that it 
ignores the fact that although state religious establishments were ended by 1833, many states 
continued to exert some control over religion. See Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, 
at 1710. 
 
186
 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan J., concurring). 
2009] INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 531 
 
Commissioners.187 In Jaffree, Chief Judge Hand of United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama held that the Establishment 
Clause does not limit state action.188 Jaffree presented three holdings 
based on his detailed historical review of the Establishment Clause’s 
ratification.189 First, the Establishment Clause was only intended as a 
restriction on the federal government.190 Second, the Establishment 
Clause was an express guarantee to the states that the federal government 
would not interfere with state religious establishments.191 Third, the 
Establishment Clause was not incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.192 Without addressing the historical analysis presented by 
Judge Hand, the Supreme Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to 
overrule the District Court on the basis that the First Amendment chiefly 
protects an individual right to religious freedom.193 The Court stated that 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the fundamental 
individual liberty protected by the Establishment Clause was extended as 
a restriction on state action.194 Again, noticeably absent from the Court’s 
reasoning is a discussion to rebut the contention that the Establishment 
Clause was in fact originally rooted in federalism concerns. Rather, the 
Court simply assumed that the clause safeguards an individual right.  
The Supreme Court has arguably failed to reconcile the true 
purpose of the Establishment Clause with incorporation. Without strong 
support, the Court held that because of its placement within the First 
Amendment, the Establishment Clause mainly protects a fundamental 
individual right.195 Thus, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 
the clause became a viable part of the Bill of Rights for incorporation. 
Unfortunately, this reasoning skirts a threshold incorporation question: Is 
the right concerned solely with an individual rather than state interest? 
Additionally, even if the right does advance some degree of individual 
right, how does this square with the federalist history of the 
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 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev’d sub nom, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 
(1985). 
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 Id. at 1128-29.  
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 See Jaffree, 554 F. Supp at 1113-19.  
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 Id. at 1114 (“The establishment clause was intended to apply only to the federal 
government.”). 
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 Id. at 1115 (“The first amendment in large part was a guarantee to the states which 
insured that the states would be able to continue whatever church-state relationship existed in 
1791.”). 
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 Id. at 1118-19 (“The historical record clearly establishes that when the fourteenth 
amendment was ratified in 1868 that its ratification did not incorporate the first amendment against 
the states.”). 
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 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (“As is plain from its text, the First 
Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom 
to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own 
conscience.”). The Court also strongly stated, “[o]ur unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment . . . makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court’s remarkable 
conclusion . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
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 See supra notes 170-177 and accompanying text. 
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Establishment Clause? Despite these unanswered questions, the Court 
has firmly stated that the Establishment Clause, regardless of its history, 
is part of an individual right of religious freedom, and thereby acts as a 
limitation on the states.196 
IV. DOES INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SHED 
LIGHT ON INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT? 
Acknowledging that federalism concerns are intricately 
connected with ratification of both the Establishment Clause197 and the 
Second Amendment,198 and that the former was later incorporated against 
the states,199 does this indicate anything about the future of the Second 
Amendment as a limitation on state action? Despite the current debate 
over the nature and scope of the right to bear arms, the Framers at least 
partially intended that the Second Amendment serve as a means to 
protect the states from federal tyranny.200 Likewise, the Establishment 
Clause was originally expected to limit only federal action in an effort to 
protect state control over religion.201 This Note argues that if the Court 
was willing to overlook the federalist underpinnings of the Establishment 
Clause and incorporate the provision,202 similarly, the Second 
Amendment’s chief federalist foundations may not bear weight today. 
Indeed, there may be comparable reasons to incorporate the Second 
Amendment. Thus, although the Supreme Court’s decision that the 
Second Amendment confers an individual right without limitation to 
militia service does not inevitably foretell incorporation, its incorporation 
may be likely.203 
A. Incorporation of the Second Amendment: The Possibility of 
Entirely Avoiding the Incorporation Standard 
Typically, before incorporating a Bill of Rights provision, the 
Supreme Court will consider whether the provision protects a right that is 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and is “so rooted in the 
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 See supra Part III.A. 
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 See supra Part II.A. 
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 See supra Part III.B. 
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 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008) (“[T]he threat that the 
new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the 
reason that right . . . was codified in a written Constitution.”); see also supra Part II.A (detailing the 
Second Amendment’s ratification). 
 
201
 See supra Part III.A. 
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 See supra Part III.B. 
 
203
 But see Wong-Ervin, supra note 2, at 180 (arguing that if the Supreme Court holds that 
the Second Amendment confers a collective militia based right, “then discussion of whether the right 
should be incorporated becomes nonsensical”). Wong-Ervin, however, neglects to account for 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause and the Court’s failure to justify incorporation of a right 
arguably linked to federalist concerns. 
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traditions and conscious of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” 
under the Palko incorporation test.204 In light of this incorporation 
standard, many scholars argue that the Supreme Court should not have 
incorporated the Establishment Clause because of its original federalist 
purpose.205 Arguably, “[b]ecause the Establishment Clause is animated 
by the principle of federalism, its incorporation against the states under 
the Palko theory of selective incorporation is logically impossible.”206 
Accordingly, if the right were drafted to protect the states from the 
federal government, it would make little sense to even consider the right 
fit for incorporation or deem it “fundamental” to the individual. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court entirely avoided discussing whether the 
Establishment Clause should be considered a “fundamental” right or 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”207 Instead, the Court gave the 
impression that merely because the Free Exercise Clause had previously 
been incorporated, the Establishment Clause should be as well.208 
Thus, this Note suggests that even if it is illogical to apply the 
incorporation standard to the Second Amendment due to its federalist 
foundation, like the Establishment Clause, it could be incorporated 
without application of the Palko test. Perhaps, however, the 
Establishment Clause can be distinguished from the Second Amendment, 
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 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937); see also supra note 8 (discussing 
incorporation). For an example of the Court’s application of this test, see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases is a 
fundamental right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right).  
  Since Palko the Court has chiefly relied on the Duncan incorporation formulation, 
which determines whether the right is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” 391 U.S. at 
149. This similar test, however, was adopted after Everson and therefore not applied therein. The 
Supreme Court could also rely on the Duncan standard if it were to assess incorporation of the 
Second Amendment. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 2, at 1124 (“Under the factors enumerated in 
Duncan, the Second Amendment is clearly not ripe for incorporation, and it is a particularly unlikely 
candidate for incorporation in the future.”). 
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 See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1157-58 (“[T]he 
nature of the state’s establishment clause right against federal dis-establishment makes it quite 
awkward to ‘incorporate’ the clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]o apply 
the clause against a state government is precisely to eliminate its right to choose whether to establish 
a religion-a right explicitly confirmed by the establishment clause itself!”); see also Rethinking the 
Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1709 (“Given the federalist nature of the Establishment Clause, 
such translation is impossible. . . . [T]he Establishment Clause prevented the federal government 
from interfering with state authority over religion. However, incorporation achieves the opposite 
result—the elimination of such authority.”). 
  Constitutional scholar Amar also argues that the First Amendment’s religious clauses 
serve a dual role and the Free Exercise Clause alone protects an individual right. Thus, “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment might best be read as incorporating free exercise, but not establishment, 
principles against state governments. Like the Speech, Press, Assembly and Petition Clauses, the 
Free Exercise Clause was pragmatically about citizens’ rights, not states’ rights: it thus invites 
incorporation.” Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, supra note 166, at 4. 
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 Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1708. 
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 Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25. 
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 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Since it had previously interpreted the 
First Amendment broadly and found it protected an individual’s “religious freedom,” the Court 
argued “[t]here is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the 
‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Id. 
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and therefore the Court would not repeat its disregard of the 
incorporation standard. If the Second Amendment’s fundamental purpose 
concerned solely the individual without regard to a state’s interest in 
protection from the federal government, the analogy to the Establishment 
Clause is unsuitable and the incorporation analysis appears logically 
applicable. As discussed, however, the Second Amendment has a similar 
history to the Establishment Clause,209 and the Everson Court relied 
heavily on the Free Exercise Clause’s incorporation as lending credence 
to incorporation of the Establishment Clause.210 Does the Second 
Amendment also include this possibility of bootstrapping an individual 
purpose with a federalist one? If so, this Note argues that this aspect of 
the Court’s reasoning in Everson may be illustrative of the Second 
Amendment’s future. 
Indeed, while the Second Amendment is generally not 
understood as extending two distinct rights,211 some recent interpretations 
by individual rights proponents illustrate that there may be dual purposes 
to the Amendment.212 Essentially, the argument follows that because the 
Framers intended that the Second Amendment protect both the states and 
the people from federal encroachment and other outside threats, the most 
effective way to do so was by conferring an individual the right to bear 
arms.213 For instance, in Parker v. District of Columbia, after a thorough 
analysis of the text and history of the Second Amendment, the Circuit 
Court concluded that the individual right to bear arms adopted by the 
Framers was “premised on the private use of arms for activities such as 
hunting and self-defense, the latter being understood as resistance to 
either private lawlessness or the depredations of a tyrannical government 
(or a threat from abroad).”214 The Court acknowledged that federalist 
concerns related to the militia were present during ratification, but held 
the “individual right facilitated militia service by ensuring that citizens 
would not be barred from keeping the arms they would need when called 
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 See supra Parts II.A, III.A. 
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 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 
211
 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1075 (2002) (“[As] evident from the 
structure of the Second Amendment, the first clause explains the purpose of the more substantive 
clause that follows, or . . . it explains the reason necessitating or warranting the enactment of the 
substantive provision.”). 
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 See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 12, at 1162 (“[T]he text of 
the Second Amendment is broad enough to protect rights of discrete individuals . . . but the 
Amendment’s core concerns are populism and federalism.”). Amar argues, however, that despite 
federalism concern inherent to both, the Second Amendment is distinguishable from the 
Establishment Clause because certain aspects of the Second Amendment shift the focus away from 
the federalism concerns present at ratification. See id. at 1165-68. 
 
213
 See Christopher J. Schmidt, An International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 989 (2007). Schmidt argues that the Second Amendment was 
enacted to serve two roles, which include “the right of the people to resist government tyranny” and 
“the means for the people to ensure the right to individual self-defense.” Id.  
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 478 F.3d 370, 395 (2007).  
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forth for militia duty.”215 Accordingly, the Second Amendment might be 
read to furnish an individual the means to keep arms as well as the states’ 
ability to preserve a militia for self-protection. 
Similarly, Justice Scalia presented a “dual” purpose argument in 
District of Columbia v. Heller. In his discussion of the relationship 
between the prefatory216 and operative clauses of the Second 
Amendment,217 Justice Scalia noted that it is “entirely sensible that 
the . . . prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was 
codified: to prevent elimination of the militia,” but argues that most 
Americans cherished the right because of its importance for “self-defense 
and hunting.”218 Accordingly, Justice Scalia argued that the Second 
Amendment was codified for one reason but valued for another. 
Although this Second Amendment dual formulation does not map 
exactly onto the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analysis noted 
above,219 the same argument is apposite. Because it is sensible to 
incorporate the Amendment for one of its purposes, a Court might again 
ignore the federalist purpose in its incorporation analysis. 
Therefore, it could be broadly argued that the Second 
Amendment, like the Establishment Clause, serves a dual function and 
was enacted to protect both the state and the individual. Thus, perhaps 
the Supreme Court will again overlook the incorporation test and extend 
the Second Amendment’s limitations to state action regardless of the 
Amendment’s federalist underpinnings. Although the Court has not 
incorporated the “individual” clause of the Second Amendment as it had 
done with the Free Exercise Clause at the time of the Everson, the same 
reasoning may still apply. On the other hand, the Everson Court also 
believed it was important that “[t]he meaning and scope of the First 
Amendment . . . in light of its history and the evils it was designed 
forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions 
of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states 
by the Fourteenth.”220 Arguably, this same case history does not support 
the Second Amendment and may provide a means to distinguish 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause.221  
Along those same lines, the Second Amendment (or more 
correctly, its “individual” clause) may be distinguished from the 
Establishment Clause on other grounds. The Establishment Clause is 
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 Id. But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (2001) (concluding that the 
Second Amendment only confers an individual right and does not confer any rights to the states 
relating to the militia). 
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 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. II. 
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 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008). 
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included within the First Amendment, arguably one of the most 
venerated protections. Perhaps the exalted nature of the First Amendment 
propelled the Establishment Clause toward incorporation. Because the 
Second Amendment does not hold the same weight and importance as 
the protections afforded and values underlying the First Amendment, 
incorporation may not be as likely.222 The most significant fact to be 
gleaned from incorporation of the Establishment Clause, however, is the 
proposition that even if a Bill of Rights provision appears to have a 
fundamental federalist purpose, if there is a means to bootstrap the 
federalist component with an individualistic provision, incorporation is 
possible. Accordingly, this Note suggests that because the Supreme 
Court has read the Second Amendment to protect an individual right,223 
incorporation may not be unlikely, regardless of the Amendment’s 
federalist roots. 
B. Religious Establishments, Militias, and the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Many scholars and several members of the Court have argued 
that incorporation of a Bill of Rights Amendment should focus on the 
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers rather than on those who 
created the Bill of Rights.224 Thus, the Court’s inquiry should focus on 
whether the right in question was one the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Framers considered “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”225 Concededly, this approach logically applies to portions of the 
Bill of Rights that protect purely individual rights, because doing so does 
not change the true nature of the right. For instance, the Fifth226 and Sixth 
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 In light of Justice Scalia’s strong language in District of Columbia v. Heller, this 
argument stands on more dubious grounds. See 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797-99 (2008). Justice Scalia 
notes, “it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth 
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 See, e.g., Yassky, supra note 2, at 629 (arguing “that the Fourteenth Amendment 
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discussed above, Justice Brennan argued in his concurring opinion in Schempp that the focus 
regarding incorporation of the Establishment Clause should be on circumstances present during 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text. Aside 
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 The Fifth Amendment states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law . . . . 
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Amendments227 were originally intended to protect the individual from 
oppressive federal conduct and only became a limitation on state action 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.228 Therefore, incorporation of these 
individual rights merely expanded their ensured protections to state 
action. This Note contends, however, that neither the structure of the 
rights conferred by the Establishment Clause, nor the Second 
Amendment, fits appropriately into the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
language. This incongruity is due to their federalist roots and their 
function as protectorates of the states from federal encroachment. In 
actuality, holding that the Establishment Clause and the Second 
Amendment limit state action does not merely change the focus or 
strength of the amendments, but rather alters their true nature and 
structure.229 Hence, each provision morphs from one that prevents the 
federal government from trampling state rights to one that precludes the 
states from carrying out the powers inherently granted to them under the 
Amendment.230 
Despite the irrationality of extending the same reasoning for 
incorporation of the individualistic provisions like the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to incorporation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme 
Court did just so in Everson v. Board of Education.231 Perhaps 
recognizing the inherent differences between the Establishment Clause 
and other Bill of Rights provisions, Justice Brennan attempted to justify 
applying the Establishment Clause against state action in School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp.232 Justice Brennan argued that 
regardless of the circumstances at ratification of the Second Amendment, 
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incorporated. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).  
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 See Kruse, supra note 114, at 126 (“[The Establishment Clause] cases suggest an 
answer to the issue whether a power expressly reserved to the states can become atrophied by a later 
amendment.”); Rethinking the Incorporation, supra note 114, at 1708 (“The function of the 
incorporation doctrine is to locate those fundamental liberties found in the Bill of Rights and extend 
their application from the federal government to the states. But incorporation theory does not seek to 
change the nature of the right at issue.”). 
 
230
 For example, because the Establishment Clause originally protected a state’s right to 
control religion, see supra Part III.A, incorporation strips the state of the ability to do so. See, e.g., 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948). 
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state religious establishments no longer existed at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.233 Justice Brennan found it 
significant that “the problem of protecting official state churches from 
federal encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who 
framed the post-Civil War Amendments.”234 In effect, Justice Brennan 
argued that regardless of the nature of the right conferred by the 
Establishment Clause at ratification, the inquiry should focus on whether 
the nature of the right had changed by the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification and whether the right continued to serve the 
same purpose.  
Justice Brennan’s reasoning in Schempp may prove particularly 
illustrative for incorporation of the Second Amendment because the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may not have supported state 
organized militias,235 and today such organizations have “faded into 
insignificance.”236 When the Framers ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the prevailing view was no longer that the federal government was the 
only governmental entity capable of tyranny.237 Second Amendment 
scholar David Yassky states that “[t]o the men who framed and ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was manifestly the states, not the federal 
government, that had perpetrated the most horrible deprivations of liberty 
in the nation’s history.”238 Yassky is, of course, referring to the Civil War 
and the nation’s violent divide. This uprising was fueled in great part by 
the rebellious states’ ability to raise an army against the government.239 
For the Second Amendment Framers, however, the states were to prevent 
and protect against “federal overreaching.”240 It was simply assumed that 
the federal government would be the “wrongful aggressor” and the states 
would serve as the “defenders of liberty.”241 Thus, it was with this 
dissimilar understanding and distrust of state power that the Framers 
passed the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict state rights and thereby 
alter the governmental structure. The states were no longer trusted with 
unfettered control of the populace for purposes of armed resistance.242 
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Therefore, this Note suggests that perhaps the focus and prominent 
interpretation of the Second Amendment had changed before ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conceivably, like the Establishment 
Clause, regardless of its original purpose, the Second Amendment may 
have morphed from a right intended to protect a state’s ability to prevent 
federal tyranny to one that now concerned solely an individual’s right to 
defend against all potential government overreaching. 
The idea that the Second Amendment has changed in nature 
since the time of ratification is further bolstered because, like 
establishments of religion, state militias largely ceased to exist after the 
nineteenth century.243 During the Second Amendment’s ratification, “[a] 
group of men did not constitute a ‘militia’ until they were organized by 
the state to serve the common defense.”244 These state sponsored 
organizations, however, are no longer operational.245 Today, the closest 
substitute for a state militia is the National Guard,246 but this institution is 
“fully equipped” by the federal government and serves national 
purposes.247 Indeed, because the National Guard is a federally controlled 
association, it arguably does not serve individual state interests.248 Thus, 
control of state militias has seemingly passed from state to national 
authority, and as a result, the significant change to this tradition perhaps 
undermined the original purpose of the Second Amendment.  
This Note contends that if the Second Amendment was ratified 
as a means to ensure the states were afforded some degree of protection 
from the federal government249 and the states have ceded the means to 
exercise that right,250 that privilege may no longer be necessary. Like the 
Establishment Clause and the end of state religious establishments, it 
could be argued that the federalist principles underlying the Second 
Amendment have eroded, and there is support for the assertion that the 
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nature of the right was altered when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified. Therefore, this Note suggests that the Schempp reasoning used to 
justify incorporation of the Establishment Clause could feasibly extend 
to the Second Amendment. 
If the Supreme Court decides to incorporate the Second 
Amendment, the resulting effect might be great. State and federal courts 
would be constitutionally required to strike down state and local gun 
control laws that infringe upon the right to bear arms. Of course, if the 
Second Amendment is incorporated against the states, judicial review of 
state gun control laws will turn on the appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny.251 In District of Columbia v. Heller, however, the Supreme 
Court failed to establish a level of scrutiny for use in determining the 
constitutionality of a federal firearm regulation.252 Justice Scalia merely 
held that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied 
to enumerated constitutional rights,” the handgun ban and prohibition 
against operable firearms in the home are unconstitutional.253 Thus, it is 
unclear how federal gun control laws should be examined in the future, 
and therefore it is also difficult to predict the appropriate standard of 
review for state laws if the Supreme Court incorporates the Second 
Amendment.254  
In any event, after incorporation, any state or city attempt to curb 
gun violence and regulate firearms may be tested under federal law.255 An 
example of a regulation at the mercy of judicial review is Chicago’s gun 
control law, which bans possession of handguns acquired after 1983 and 
requires registration every two years for guns obtained prior to 1983.256 
Another illustration is New York City’s regulation that allows handgun 
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possession as long as the owner obtains a permit from a Police 
Department.257 If the Supreme Court determines that the Second 
Amendment should be incorporated, these regulations will be open to 
constitutional challenge regardless of the inherent wisdom behind their 
passage. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In reality, the benefit of comparing the Second Amendment with 
the Establishment Clause depends on what path the Court eventually 
decides to take. A review of the history behind the Establishment Clause 
and Second Amendment’s ratification, however, highlights that the 
provisions reflect the very same concerns and questions regarding the 
proper role of and relationship between the federal and state 
governments.  
Ultimately, both the Establishment Clause and the Second 
Amendment emerged as part of a larger compromise between those who 
sought to leave power with the individual states and those who believed 
power should be lodged in a centralized government.258 The Second 
Amendment provided a means for the states to arm its people and protect 
themselves against the possibility of federal tyranny.259 The 
Establishment Clause initially prevented the federal government from 
both imposing its religious will and acting to destroy state religious 
control.260 The Court was willing to overlook the federalist underpinnings 
during incorporation of the Establishment Clause, however, and 
surprisingly held that the provision is also a limitation on state action 
over the individual.261 This Note should shed at least some light on the 
reasons for or against incorporation of these Bill of Rights provisions.  
Thus far, the Court has not been disposed to incorporate the 
Second Amendment against the states, conceivably because it has 
impliedly recognized the Amendment’s underlying purpose.262 Whether 
or not the Second Amendment’s federalist history will be set aside 
remains a question to be determined, but perhaps in the meantime the 
Establishment Clause can tell us a little something about that possibility.  
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